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William Vallicella (2020) puts forward three thoughtful and sophisticated objections to self-
relating internalism, my theory of the unity of states of affairs (2008, 2018).  On this theory, a 
state of affairs is unified in virtue of a formal constituent relation, U*, relating itself to the other 
constituents of the state of affairs. In other words, according to self-relating internalism, the 
unity of a state of affairs is due to the fact that U* is related to its relata by itself. For example, 
the state of affairs a’s having F, or F(a), is assayed as U*(U*, F, a). This solution to the problem 
of unity explains the difference between a state of affairs and the sum of its constituents: in a’s 
being F—which when assayed is identical to U*(U*, F, a,)—U* relates (itself to) F and a, 
whereas in the sum [U*, F, a] it is does not relate. This difference between U* as active in the 
state of affairs and inert in the sum is at the heart of Vallicella’s first and second objections. 
His first objection is that there can be no constituent of a state of affairs with the required 
unifying power given the need for ‘ontological analysis’, or at least that such an entity is 
mysterious. I shall argue that this objection, which it is helpful to discuss at some length, is in 
part begging the question, and in part invoking unsupported assumptions about how to 
understand metaphysical theories in general and self-relating internalism in particular. His 
second objection is that self-relating internalism violates the principle of the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals. I respond that this fails to appreciate the unimportance in metaphysics of either 
abundant properties or relational properties, or both. His final objection is that my explanation 
of the unity of states of affairs is viciously circular. I counter by showing that the argument of 
this objection is invalid or at least not sound. 
 
2. Vallicella’s first objection: U* cannot be a constituent of states of affairs, or at least it 
is unintelligible how it can 
Vallicella’s first objection is a disjunction: U* cannot be a constituent of states of affairs or it 
is unintelligible how it can. I shall argue that the first ‘ontological’ disjunct of this two-pronged 
charge is question begging; and that the second ‘epistemological’ disjunct invokes an 
unsupported meta-metaphysical thesis that ‘ontological analysis’ is the only way of 
understanding U*.  To begin with, Vallicella instructively distinguishes between a privative 
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and a positive sense of being ‘self-relating’. The former is just that when U* is actually related 
to its relata, this is not by another relation. The latter is the claim that U* is related to its relata 
by itself. The privative sense suffices to block Bradley’s regress, but it does nothing to explain 
or ground the unity of states of affairs. As Vallicella notes (p. 171), it is the positive sense that 
I have in mind. I would add that further terminological clarification is needed, since the notion 
of ‘ontological analysis’ is likewise ambiguous. It can mean either the (making of a) list of the 
constituents/parts of a whole, or it can mean the intellectual analysis of a whole. Vallicella 
invokes the second meaning repeatedly and insists that, roughly, an ontological constituent, 
such as U*, is intelligible just when it is included in an ontological analysis – call this the 
Analytic Thesis (AT). The adverb ‘at least’ in his first, disjunctive objection might appear to 
suggest that he considers the second disjunct to be subsidiary to the first one, but in fact this 
seems not to be the case. Indeed, having clarified the basic distinction between the privative 
and positive at the outset of his critique, Vallicella immediately proceeds to objecting that 
ontological analysis cannot make self-relating in the positive sense intelligible: 
 
All ontological analysis can do is to enumerate the constituents of a state of affairs, or, 
more generally, the parts of a whole. Analytic understanding proceeds by resolving a 
given whole into its parts, and ultimately into simple parts. But there is more to a 
(nonmereological) whole than its parts. There is the unity in virtue of which the parts are parts 
of a whole. The whole is one entity; the parts are many entities.  (p. 171) 
 
He maintains that what I am doing is just that: trying to identify the unity of a whole (state of 
affairs) with a part of it. But since U* is a constituent of the state of affairs, ‘the attempt to 
understand synthesis analytically is doomed to failure’ (ibid.). For ‘no proper part of a whole 
is its unity, and this for the simple reason that the unity is the unity of all the parts’ (p. 172). 
However, one can say that, 
 
the unity of the parts, which is distinct from any part, and from all of them, is brought about by 
a special part, the unifier. But then that special part, without ceasing to be a proper part, would 
have to exercise a synthesizing function. This synthesizing is what eludes analytic 
understanding. Simply to posit that the unifier U* has the ability to synthesize is […] a kind of 
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deus ex machina move. Leaving God out of it, Meinertsen's U* is a principium ex machina.  
(pp. 171–172) 
 
I agree with this characterisation of U* that it, a ‘special part’, is exercising a ‘synthesising 
function’. In that sense, U* is radically different from other relations. Hence, it is not on a par 
with the other constituents of a the whole (state of affairs) listed in its ontological analysis. 
Vallicella is quite right that it therefore cannot be understood analytically: by definition, the 
synthesising power of U* is not elucidated by its featuring in an enumeration of constituents in 
an ontological analysis. Yet, this would be a problem for me only if ontological analysis were 
the be all and end all of understanding U*, i.e. if AT were true of it. One could probably be 
forgiven for thinking it is, since U* is after all a constituent of states of affairs and there appears 
to be no obvious alternative to AT for understanding constituents. But the synthesising power  
of U* (‘how it works’, its role or its function) arguably is not a constituent—a point I shall 
return to later in this section. And even if it were, or even if there were no distinction between 
a constituent and its function in the first place, I am not aware of any independent argument for 
AT. I therefore reject this principle with a clean conscience. That said, I appreciate that, for 
proponents of AT, the positing of U* must feel like a kind of deus ex machina or a principium 
ex machina move. Insofar as U* is an inference to the best explanation, however, this is not 
really a problem for me, as Vallicella seems to acknowledge (p. 177). 
Still, it is interesting to note that Vallicella could have used AT in an argument for the 
first disjunct of his objection (i.e. that U* cannot unify). Such an argument might look like this: 
 
(1) If U* unifies, then it is intelligible how it works [assumption]. 
(2) How a constituent works is intelligible if and only if this working is shown by ontological 
analysis [AT].  
(3) How U* works is not shown by ontological analysis [correct observation]. 
Therefore, 
(4) It is not intelligible how U* works [(2), (3)]. 
Therefore,  
(5) U* does not unify. [(1), (4)]. 
 
This is clearly a valid argument. But is it also sound? Arguably not. True, assumption (3) is 
correct, as Vallicella is at pains to stress.  But while (2) is also asserted as true—assumed here 
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for the sake of argument—(1) seems false as it stands. (1) would probably be true in certain 
‘idealistic’ contexts of equivalence between the intelligible and the real/true, but such contexts 
are markedly contrary to the realist, Armstrongian background assumptions of self-relating 
internalism. In any case, given that (2) is false, I maintain that the argument is unsound even if 
(1) were true.  
To his credit, however, Vallicella appears to offer some support, independently of AT, 
for his claim that U* is unintelligible. He reasons that, on self-relating internalism, if states of 
affairs exist, U* of course also exists; but if so, it must either (i) be found in perception or (ii) 
be able to be singled out in thought. As to (i), he is not in doubt that it cannot be perceived: 
 
If I see that a book is on a table, then I see a book, a table, and possibly also the relation referred 
to by ‘on.’ What I don’t see, however, is the referent of ‘is’: the being of the book’s being on 
the table. Since I don’t see the being of the book’s being on the table, I do not see U*. I cannot 
single it out in perception. (p. 172) 
 
Now, the claim that U* cannot be perceived is intimately related to the more general view that 
states of affairs cannot be perceived. Evaluation of these tenets are quite a vexed issue, but I 
fortunately did not have to go into them in my book. For the same reason, I shall not do it here, 
though I note that I am inclined to agree with Vallicella on this point, certainly with regard to 
the specific claim that the unifying constituent of states of affairs, U*,  is not perceivable. But 
it is at any rate more important to find out if U* can be ‘singled out in thought’, as Vallicella 
calls it. He insists that it cannot be that either. In his argument for this, he first clarifies the 
sense in which the material constituents of a state of affairs are independent of it. If S = Fa, 
then a and F are what he calls ‘weakly separable’ of S in the sense that they can exist without 
S existing, provided a instantiates other properties and F is instantiated elsewhere. By contrast, 
U* is not weakly independent of S. If it is the actual unifier of S, then it cannot exist 
independently of it and its material constituents, a and F—though it can of course exist 
independently of them provided it is instantiated elsewhere (it is an immanent universal 
amongst others). As he puts it, ‘as the active ingredient in S, [U*] is inseparable from a, from 
F, and from S’ (ibid.). So, U* cannot be ‘singled out in thought’. It might even appear that U* 
is a contradictory and hence impossible entity: as a constituent of the state of affairs, it is weakly 
separable from it; as a unifier of S, it is not weakly separable from it. Vallicella, in words if not 
in spirit, does not go that far, though. Instead, he just, once again, draws the decidedly more 
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modest conclusion ‘that it is unintelligible how a (proper) part of a state of affairs [U*] could 
serve as its unifier’ (p. 173).  
This argument that U* cannot be ‘singled out in thought’ seems to have some force, 
and it does seem independent of AT. Given this, someone might now object that at least 
something should be said about the ‘mysterious’ ways of U*, to make it appear less 
unintelligible. Perhaps we could appeal to the memorable glue analogy put forward by 
Reinhardt Grossmann (1992, pp. 55-56), then? Grossmann’s claim is that if two boards are 
glued together, one does not need ‘super-glue’ to glue the glue to the boards, ‘super-duper-
glue’ to glue the ‘super-glue’ to the glue, and so on. Rather, the glue is self-relating in the sense 
that it is not glued to the boards by another. This is analogous to U* being self-relating in the 
sense that it is not related to its relata by another. But, as Vallicella points out, this is self-
relating in the privative sense: ‘By 'privative' I simply mean that the self-gluing glue is not 
glued by another. If the glue and the relation U* were self-gluing and self-relating in a positive 
sense, then they would be agents of an action’ (p. 173). And as pointed out above, it is the 
positive sense of self-relating that is relevant to our purposes here.  Fortunately, I do not think 
that the falsehood of Grossman’s analogy really is a problem for self-relating internalism. For 
it does not really seem incumbent on me to say anything about the workings of an inference to 
the best explanation, given that, as I have argued at length (2008, 20018), the alternative 
explanations fail.  
Still, out of politeness, as it were, it is worth reiterating one of the most important 
characteristics of U*: it has a synthesising power. Unlike Vallicella, I consider it misleading to 
go further and call U* an ‘agent of an action’, taking this in a more or less literal sense, since 
this wrongly implies that U* is an animated, or even person-like, entity.) Its synthesising power 
is evidenced by the very name of its parent theory: self-relating. Admittedly, in my book, I 
failed to make explicit, or at least clearly imply, that I consider the self-relating or synthesising 
of U* to be an ‘activity’ (or ‘active role’) distinct from U* in itself—though I had done this in 
earlier work (2008, pp. 14-15).1 This activity (or active role) of U* is not a constituent of the 
state of affairs, so it is trivially true that it is not shown in an ontological analysis. The specific 
ontological reason that it is not a constituent of the state of affairs is arguably that it is a 
relational property, cf. my reply to Vallicella’s second objection in the following section. But 
 
1 I am ignoring the distinction between ‘synthesising’, ‘self-relating’ and ‘activity (or active role)’ on 
the one hand, and ‘synthesising power’ on the other, since it does not matter here – though, in other 
contexts, the general difference between an activity and a power (disposition) is most important. 
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this reason is incidental to the present response. All that is needed here is that, intuitively, an 
activity (or active role) of a constituent of a state of affairs is not an additional constituent. 
 
3. Vallicella’s second objection: by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, U* is a contradictory 
entity 
As Vallicella points out, the material constituents of a state of affairs are numerically identical 
in the state of affairs and in the sum of these constituents. But what about U* itself, a formal 
constituent? Is U* in the state of affairs U*(U*, F, a) likewise numerically identical to U* in 
the sum [U*+ F + a]? Whichever it is, trouble is spelled, he claims. Considering first the option 
that it is, he reasons—correctly, in my view—that it actually follows from the contingency of 
states of affairs that there is such numerical identity: ‘It must be possible that the same 
constituents exist either unified or not unified’ (p. 174, original emphasis). However, as he 
observes, U* in the sum is inert while U* in the state of affairs is active—and being inert and 
being active are distinct properties. Hence, by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, either (i) U* is 
inert in both sum and state of affairs or (ii) active in both sum and state of affairs. But if (i), 
then no state of affairs is constituted; and if (ii), there is no difference between the sum and the 
state of affairs, which their contingency demands. Either way, no contingent state of affairs is 
constituted, and U* therefore cannot be identical in the sum and the state of affairs. In short, 
self-relating internalism is contradictory, that is, in a manner of speaking, U* is a contradictory 
entity.2 
This objection can be retorted to in two related ways. The first one, which I shall merely 
hint at here, is this. Intuitively, being active and being inert are relational properties. If this does 
not seem intuitive to you, take instead the more theoretical counterpart features of U* on self-
relating internalism, being self-relating and not-being-self-relating. They are explicitly 
relational. As Vallicella would probably agree, in the context of state of affairs ontology, other 
things being equal, we should not take abundant properties and relations with ontological 
seriousness, only sparse ones. (The reason is that the abundant are what I call ‘truthmaking 
reducible’, which means that they fail to exist at the level of truthmakers.) Unfortunately for 
Vallicella, relational properties are abundant (Meinertsen 2020). Given this, we should not take 
 
2 Note that, as mentioned, Vallicella also thinks it that it leads to trouble if U* is active in the state of 
affairs and inert in the sum, i.e. if U* in the state of affairs is non-identical to U* in the sum. It is obvious 
why he thinks this: by way of argument for it, he just repeats the point that such non-identity is 
incompatible with the contingency of states of affairs.  
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them with ontological seriousness. Hence, a fortiori we need not be worried by an objection 
which, like Vallicella’s, relies on them. My second riposte also concerns relational properties 
but appeals to established literature rather than my own metaphysics: even if they were sparse 
and hence ontologically important, Vallicella’s objection would still fail, and by his own lights. 
For relational properties cannot be included in the domain of the (converse) of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals if this principle is taken as true, since as Max Black famously 
showed (1952), if they are, it is false.  
 
4. Vallicella’s third objection: my explanation of state of affairs unity is viciously 
circular 
Vallicella’s third objection focuses on the existence conditions of U* and argues from this that 
my explanation of the unity of states of affairs unity is viciously circular: 
a) A state of affairs exists if and only if its constituents form a unity. 
b) U* is a constituent of states of affairs that explains their unity. 
Therefore 
c) U* is a constituent of states of affairs that explains their existence. (from a, b) 
d) U* cannot exercise its explanatory function unless it exists. 
Therefore 
e) The existence of U* explains the existence of states of affairs. 
But 
f) U* cannot exist except in a state of affairs. 
Therefore 
g) The existence of states of affairs explains the existence of U* 
h) Given the asymmetry of explanation, (e) and (g) are contradictory, and 
Meinertsen's explanation of the existence of states of affairs in terms of U* is 
viciously circular. (p. 175) 
Although this is prima facie a good argument, I think that it fails. First and foremost, due to the 
intensionality of ‘explains’, (a) and (b) quite simply do not entail (c). In general, if X and Y are 
co-extensional, as the unity and existence of states of affairs indeed are, then it does not follow 
that what explains X also explains Y, since the context is intensional. Secondly, suppose instead 
that (c) had just been assumed rather than put forward as an entailment. The inference from it 
and (d) to (e) seems valid alright; but this sub-argument is arguably not sound, for (c) is 
arguably false. Or at least, I see no reason why it should be true. Why should we think that if 
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U* explains the unity of states of affairs, as it does on my theory3, it also explains their 
existence? On my theory, the existence of a state of affairs, e.g. the state of affairs U*(U*, F, 
a) is identical to U* relating itself to F and a. But U* does not ‘explain’ this relating, nor does 
it ‘explain’ that the state of affairs exists. An ‘explanation’ of the existence of U*(U*, F, a) is 
not involved at all. Nor should it be: thanks to the contingency of states of affairs, it is not a 
metaphysical task to explain their existence. When U* relates itself to F and a and thereby 
unifies a’s being F, it does not explain that it relates itself to F and a. In short, (c) is false; and 
by parity of reasoning, so is (h).  
Incidentally, I do not see it as not a drawback of self-relating internalism that it does 
not explain the existence of states of affairs in this sense, since it should not be assigned with 
this task in the first place. True, by the Principle of Sufficient Reason, it is probably reasonable 
to demand an explanation for the existence of each state of affairs, i.e. why in each particular 
case U* relates itself to the other constituents of the state of affairs. But given that states of 
affairs (in the present sense) are contingent, this requirement is arguably not met by a 
metaphysical explanation anyway, but only by a causal one—possibly in conjunction with one 
or more analytic statements. For example, there is sufficient causal explanation of why U* 
relates itself to the property of boiling and the pot of water when the water is 100 ℃ under 
atmospheric pressure and hence of the existence of this state of affairs. Similarly, there is a 
sufficient explanation of Xantippe’s becoming a widow, i.e. why U* relates itself to becoming 
a widow and Xantippe, namely, the causal explanations of Socrates’s death and his being 
married to her, in conjunction with the analytic statement that ‘becoming a widow’ means 
‘losing a spouse’. In any event, self-relating internalism, which explains the unity of states of 
affairs, in general as well as in particular cases, need not deal with explanation of the ‘existence’ 
of states of affairs, neither in general nor in particular. In short, U* is not self-explanatory, as 
it were; it is only self-relating. Hence, Vallicella’s third argument also fails.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
If what I have argued is correct, Vallicella’s three objections to self-relating internalism are 
unsuccessful. His first criticism, that U* cannot be a constituent of states of affairs or at least 
that it is unintelligible how it can, is either begging the question or, at best, relying on an 
unsupported meta-metaphysical thesis about what constitutes understanding of an ontological 
 
3 To be precise, the self-relating of U* explains the unity of a state of affairs.  
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constituent.  During my rejection of his use of this thesis, I had to invoke my distinction 
between U* and its activity, which admittedly is inchoate. Future research is required to clarify 
it. Vallicella’s second and third criticisms, which I have devoted less attention to in this paper, 
do not work either. The first of the two, that U* is a contradictory entity, fails, as it does not, 
as it were, appreciate the metaphysical limitations of relational properties (shortcomings 
demonstrated by my own work or by Black’s classic case against the Identity of Indiscernibles). 
The second one, that my explanation of state of affairs unity is viciously circular, fails, since it 
either commits a non sequitur or imposes illegitimate explanatory requirements on U*.4 
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4 Thanks to Jean-Baptiste Guillon, Erwin Tegtmeier and William Vallicella for comments on an 
earlier draft of this reply. 
